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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
Justice can be best served by allowing discovery in criminal cases. It is
unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not decide the Jencks case on purely
constitutional grounds. The states, however, are gradually adopting the policy
considerations of the Court and we may look forward to an enlightened policy
of criminal discovery in future years. For the present though, we will have to
content ourselves with limited advancements in "at trial" discovery. Pretrial
discovery is subject to the most serious objections and will be strongly resisted.
Perhaps eventually, the legislature will take the initiative away from the courts
and declare a policy consonant with justice and modern procedural reform.
Until then, we must praise the leaders and hope for followers.
F. P.M.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION ELICITED AFTER INDICTMENT
In People v. Waterman,25 the defendant was convicted of robbery in the
first degree, second degree grand larceny and assault. A complete confession
made by Waterman after indictment and in the absence of counsel was ad-
mitted into evidence at the trial. The confession was obtained through inter-
rogation by a police officer who knew that defendant had been indicted. At
this interrogation after indictment the defendant did not request counsel, nor
was the defendant told that counsel could be present. The Appellate Division,
in a three to two decision, relying on the recent Court of Appeals decision of
People v. DiBiasi,2 6 reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.27 The
court stated that the confession was inadmissible as evidence because it was
obtained after indictment in the absence of counsel in violation of defendant's
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision on similar grounds.
The dissenting opinion written in the Appellate Division was adopted by
two of the dissenters in the Court of Appeals. The dissent refused to recognize
People v. DiBiasi as indicative of a broad exclusionary rule of evidence and
would have limited DiBiasi to the peculiar facts therein. The dissent pointed
out that Waterman, unlike DiBiasi, had not surrendered to authorities by
arrangement of counsel but had been apprehended by the police. This factual
differentiation forrhulated by the dissent is without merit. A reasonable con-
clusion, albeit disagreeable, from the dissent's argument would be: that if law
enforcement authorities are put on notice that defendant has an attorney, his
right to counsel during police interrogation after indictment is safeguarded;
however, if defendant has the misfortune of being apprehended by authorities
without an attorney representing him, then his right to counsel for post-
indictment interrogation ceases.
Implicit within the DiBiasi and Waterman cases is a contest between
individual liberties and the effective solution of crimes against society. The
25. 9 N.Y.2d 561, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
26. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
27. 12 A.D.2d 84, 208 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1st Dep't 1960).
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accused is advised of his right to counsel at various stages of a criminal case.28
A confession elicited from a defendant after indictment in the absence of coun-
sel and used against him at his trial clearly violates his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. 29 Although this privilege can be waived by the
accused,30 a waiver cannot be made until the defendant knows of the existence
of this privilege. The knowledge of this privilege can be gained in most in-
stances only from counsel.
If the defendant desires to open his heart to the law enforcement officials
after indictment, he should be properly advised of his privileges by counsel.
Too often the law enforcer assumes the defendant is guilty, but, without a
confession, he will go unpunished.3 1 However, effective law enforcement never
connoted eliciting confessions from an accused. If interrogation is necessary
after indictment, the presence of defense counsel is imperative in order that
he may properly advise the defendant of the repercussions which will reason-
ably follow from his confession. The defense attorney cannot compel his client
to keep silent, although he will in many instances suggest silence. This silence
is not intended to harass the police officer but to protect the rights of the
defendant. Undermining law enforcement and protecting the accused against
self-incrimination should be clearly differentiated. The lawyer's task is to
protect the rights of his client, not to detract from the administration of
criminal justice.
The district attorney, financed by the State and staffed with competent
personnel, has ample time to interrogate and elicit a confession from the accused
before indictment. Prior to the preliminary arraignment before a magistrate,
the law enforcement officials may interrogate the suspect.82 After the prelimi-
nary arraignment and before the indictment, the defendant is confined many
days, during which another opportunity to question him is presented. After
indictment, the State authorizes the district attorney to represent it in the
prosecution of the defendant and designates him as the presenter of the evi-
dence.33 The case is now within his dominion, and it follows, therefore, that
he is responsible for the actions of all law enforcement officials who interrogate
the accused. By permitting the questioning of the accused in the absence of
his own counsel, the district attorney violates the Canons of Professional Ethics
which are addressed to prosecutor and defender alike.3 4
28. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 8 (advised of right to counsel at preliminary arraign-
ment); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 188 (accused must be advised of right to counsel at
indictment); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308 (accused must be advised of right to counsel
at arraignment before trial).
29. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
30. N.Y. Penal Law § 2446.
31. See People v. Getlow, 234 N.Y. 132, 136 N.E. 317 (1922), aff'd, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
32. Although thirty-six hours has been held to be an unlawful detention of the suspect
from the time of his arrest to the time of his preliminary arraignment, a confession made
during this time has been held to be admissible at trial. See People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192,
192 N.E. 289 (1934).
33. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 294.
34. Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 9, Negotiations With Opposite Party:
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The law has progressed from excluding confessions obtained by beatings, 35
by psychological coercion,36 and presently by questioning after indictment with-
out counsel present. It should be noted that the Waterman and DiBiasi cases
are not concerned with voluntary or involuntary confessions. The formulation
of this rule of exclusion would seem to indicate that the Court is not satisfied
with the involuntary confession-exclusion rule. Law enforcement officials rely
too extensively on sweating a "voluntary" confession out of the accused. This
lackadaisical approach to law enforcement is not satisfactory. A more intelligent
approach to the investigation of a crime is sorely needed. A confession may be
relied upon too heavily and other evidence which is not located may lead to
acquittal of a defendant rather than conviction. It is not the task of the
defendant to make the law enforcement officer's job easier, but it is society's
duty to protect the rights of each and every individual who has committed a
crime, no matter how serious.
The question which still remains is whether the DiBiasi-Waterman rule
will be extended so as to exclude from evidence those confessions made prior
to indictment in the absence of counsel. The issue will be presented to the
Court in People v. Jackson, Robinson and Williams, which is now pending on
appeal to the Appellate Division.3 7 Defendant Jackson, who had refused to
admit any participation in the murder of Henry Duscher, was placed in a cell
at Buffalo Police Headquarters next to a prisoner who was told by police officers
to elicit admissions from the defendant. While the defendant freely confided
to his fellow prisoner, two police officers listened to the entire conversation from
behind the cell. These admissions were elicited after defendant was arraigned
in Buffalo City Court but before indictment. On appeal the defendant will
attempt to invoke the DiBiasi-Waterman rule to have the admissions excluded.
This is defendant's only recourse because New York does not exclude confes-
sions elicited by fraudulent tactics or by methods of trickery as used here. 38
The tactics of the Buffalo Police are inexcusable, and an extension of the
DiBiasi-Waterman rule to pre-indictment interrogation would precipitate a
law enforcement agency at the municipality level comparable to that of Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Although this achievement would be highly desirable,
it would reasonably seem unlikely at this time. To create, therefore, a practical
balance between individual rights and the effective enforcement of crimes, the
DiBiasi-Waterman rule should continue to apply to post-indictment interroga-
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with
a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend
to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to
advise him as to the law.
35. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
36. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1942).
37. The defendants were convicted in County Court, County of Erie, on October 23,
1959.
38. People v. Buffom, 214 N.Y. 53, 108 N.E. 184 (1915); People v. Wentz, 37 N.Y. 303
(1867).
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tion. Unlikely or not, as this note goes to the publishers, a recent decision in




ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION AFTER REQUEST FOR COUNSEL IGNORED
The Court of Appeals, in People v. Noble,40 was once again called upon
to decide whether a conviction for first degree murder was to be set aside
because of the use of certain statements claimed to be involuntary.
Three judges agreed that where an Assistant District Attorney ignored de-
fendant's inquiry as to his right to counsel before making the statements, the
use of the statements at his trial violated the fundamental fairness essential
to the concept of justice and constituted an invasion of defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. Two judges concurred for reversal but on the limited
ground that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defend-
ant's confession was voluntary. Two judges dissented reasoning that since there
is no duty to tell the defendant of his rights and privileges,41 declining to
advise is no more prejudicial than failing to advise.
The position taken by the three judges clearly goes beyond the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and further expands the
rights of the accused in regard to the use of admissions and confessions
obtained by police officers in the interim between arrest and trial. In 1936,
the United States Supreme Court was first called upon to apply the due process
clause to a case involving a state court conviction for first degree murder based
on the use of a coerced confession.42 The Court held that conviction on a
confession which was admittedly coerced violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Eight years later, in Askcraft v. Tennessee, a more liberal Court held that
36 hours of continuous questioning without sleep rendered the confession inher-
ently coerced. 43 A strong dissent reasoned that while it was true that long and
persistent questioning was coercive, so is arrest alone. They stated that the test
heretofore was ". . . whether the confessor was in possession of his own will
and self-control at the time of the confession." The dissent's conclusion was
that the confession was voluntary and trustworthy and, therefore, its use did
not violate due process of law.
Dy 1952, the Court had returned to the position taken by the dissent in
Askcraft and in 1953, it further refined the voluntary-trustworthy test to the
extent that it became a question of whether the procedure used (e.g., interro-
gation) had a coercive effect upon the particular person making the confession.
44
In 1958, the Court held in Payne v. Arkansas that if the confession was co-
39. People v. Meyer,--A.D.2d-(lst Dep't October 10, 1961).
40. 9 N.Y.2d 571, 216 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1961).
41. People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. 112 (1909).
42. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
43. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
44. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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